AdminZeroadminzero.io

Least privilege for IT

Take Super Admin off the helpdesk.

Technicians reset passwords, change groups, and pull logs from one console. They never get Super Admin, Global Admin, or Slack Org Owner. Your tenant owns the OAuth apps. Security sees every action and cannot run one.

WorkspaceOktaSlackM365TeamsZoomNotionIntuneJamfKandjiFigmaAirtableMiroLucidSalesforceNetSuite+ any API you name

The split

Others automate the ticket. We remove the god account.

Chat agents still need someone with Super Admin so they can act. Adminzero is the execution plane so that seat never lives on the helpdesk.

What others do

  • Put an agent in Slack or Teams and auto-resolve tickets.
  • Still need a Super Admin, Global Admin, or Org Owner somewhere so the agent can act.
  • Treat identity writes as chat outcomes. The evidence is a model log.
  • Invent connectors on the fly. Scope and blast radius are whoever the token is.

What we do

  • Execute the same IT work from a console the technician is allowed to use.
  • No privileged seat in Google, Okta, Slack, Entra, or the rest. The tenant’s scoped app does the write.
  • Every action carries operator, role, IP, and ticket. Security is read-only.
  • Name an app. SpaceXAI researches the API, drafts actions and connect steps. You review, then it lands in your catalog.

Why they choose us

Security wants fewer keys. IT still has to turn them.

Security leaders

Prove who can change identity.

Standing Super Admin on the helpdesk is the incident. They choose Adminzero because the desk never holds that seat, the security role cannot mutate, and evidence packs are control-mapped — not a dump of everything the bot touched.

  • Security cannot launch, approve, or connect apps.
  • Customer-owned OAuth and API JSON. Pointers to their vault, never a password store.
  • SOX, ISO 27001, and SOC 2 exports only the controls for that framework.
  • Passkeys, IP lock, geo screen, recorded browser when there is no API.

IT leaders

Do the work without collecting seats.

The work still has to get done. They choose Adminzero because technicians keep resetting passwords and changing groups — without collecting god accounts in every admin console, and without waiting on an engineer for standard blast-radius.

  • One operator replaces a privileged seat in each connected tool.
  • High blast-radius waits for an engineer. Standard work does not.
  • Ticket deep-links from ServiceNow, Freshservice, or Jira. The ITSM never holds SaaS tokens.
  • Ask AI for a new app. Review the API steps. Save. Actions show up next to Workspace and Okta.

Security model

Reduced access. Same IT. Proof for the auditor.

Standing privilege is the incident

A Super Admin seat on the helpdesk is a durable attack path. Adminzero executes as the customer’s scoped app, not as a shared god account in every SaaS console.

Fewer keys. Same work.

One operator in Adminzero replaces a privileged seat in Google, Okta, Slack, Entra, and the rest. High blast-radius waits for an engineer. Security cannot approve or run it.

Customer-owned credentials

Each tenant’s OAuth client and API JSON stay in that tenant. We store pointers to their vault, not a password store. Disconnect is revoke — not hope someone rotated a shared admin.

Evidence, not a chatbot log

Every write carries operator, role, IP, ticket, and the command. SOX, ISO 27001, and SOC 2 packs export only the controls for that framework. Security is read-only.

How it runs

Connect once. Role the people. Execute here. Grow the catalog.

01

Connect their apps

OAuth as Super Admin once, or paste the service-account JSON / API token the customer owns. Domain-wide delegation stays in their Admin console.

02

Put people in roles

Technician, engineer, security. The console hides what a role cannot do. Passkeys and IP policy on sign-in.

03

Run the work here

Actions, workflows, directory, logs. High blast-radius requests an engineer. Security watches and cannot click.

04

Grow the catalog

Name another app. AI researches the public API, writes connect steps and actions. You save. It shows on Integrations and Actions.

Everything in the console

Directory, actions, logs, posture, evidence, browser.

One tenant. Customer-owned credentials. Technicians, engineers, and security see different surfaces.

Directory

One people list from Okta, Workspace, Entra, and Slack. Groups, aliases, OU, typeahead.

Actions

Suspend, reset password, sign out, group add/remove, tokens, MDM, SaaS admin — catalogued, ticketed, audited.

Workflows

Offboard and other multi-app runs. SpaceXAI picks catalog steps. High blast-radius stays gated.

Integrations

Customer OAuth or API JSON per app. API tests ping live endpoints. AI can add a new app to this tenant’s catalog.

Configuration health

Org score over time. Google Admin and Okta HealthInsight-style checks. Sections collapse. Apps isolate.

Security logs

Pull on connect and hourly. 429s back off. Investigate by person. Dump files for apps without a live pull.

Compliance

Framework packs: SOX ITGC, ISO Annex A, SOC 2 CC6–CC8, or a named custom set. Only that framework’s evidence.

Hosted browser

Isolated Chromium or the tenant’s Browserbase. Paste from the password manager. Recording and event log. No vault.

ITSM execute

Deep-link a ticket into Actions, or POST a signed execute so Adminzero runs the command. Tokens stay here.

No privileged seats in the tools

Technicians never collect Super Admin, Global Admin, or Org Owner. They work here, under tenant RBAC, on the customer’s own OAuth and API credentials.

Security cannot change a thing

The security role sees directory, events, and logs. It cannot launch actions, approve blast-radius, or touch integrations. Review is not a second admin.

Ticket-linked execution

Launch from ServiceNow, Freshservice, or Jira with the user and ticket already filled. The ITSM does not hold SaaS tokens. Adminzero does the write and the audit.

Hosted browser when there is no API

Isolated Chromium or the tenant’s Browserbase. Paste from the password manager. We never store passwords. The session is recorded.

Posture and logs without extra admin

Pull configuration health and security logs from connected apps. Investigate by person. Export framework-specific evidence. No live firehose, no extra Super Admin for the SOC.

RBAC

Three roles. Security cannot change a thing.

IT Technician

Day-to-day IT. Runs standard actions. High blast-radius waits for an engineer.

  • Directory and activity
  • Standard actions
  • Request approval for high blast-radius

Cannot: Events and Security logs · Audit log · Admin settings

IT Engineer

Full console. Approves high blast-radius work and owns tenant settings.

  • Every action
  • Events and Security logs
  • Approvals
  • Integrations and admin settings

Security

Read-only reviewer. Inspects people, events, and stored logs. Cannot mutate.

  • Directory
  • Activity
  • Events
  • Security logs
  • Audit log

Cannot: Launch actions · Approvals · Scans · Admin settings

Add an app

Tell us the product. AI researches the API.

An engineer names PagerDuty, GitHub, CrowdStrike — or pastes docs. SpaceXAI drafts connect steps and catalog actions. You review. Save puts it on Integrations with API instructions and on Actions with Workspace, Okta, and the rest. Live writes still use the tenant’s token, RBAC, and audit.

Pricing

Priced per operator — not a privileged seat in every tool.

Standard

Contact

Core console for one IT team. RBAC, hosted browser, Google or Microsoft sign-in, and audit.

Talk to us

Advanced

Contact

IP lockdown, longer log keep, security investigation, and hosted browser.

Talk to us

Enterprise

Custom

Clerk SSO, Browserbase, customer-owned databases, isolated runtime, and unlimited log keep.

Talk to us

Early access

Stay informed. The desk should not hold Super Admin.